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Preface
This is a theoretical/philosophical
tended to bring to the reader's
literature

attention

paper which is inan emerging

and discussion which holds potentially

pro-

ductive consequences for the understanding of man. This
thesis does not offer completed fonnulations or empirical
groundings.

The purpose is to create a basis for dialogue.

This paper will initially

specify a current conflict

in psychology around the different

metaphors used to define

the image of man. A theoretical/philosophical

basis for

viewing the process of generating models of man and his
behavior as essentially
A specific

"metaphorical" is then presented.

category of human behavior knownas the neurotic

paradox (henceforth abbreviated NP) is defined and a review
of literature

on the root metaphorical interpretations

the NP is discussed.

of

The prominent extant models of human

behavior reviewed in this discussion are those based on the
metaphors Spirit,

Disease, Machine, and Seed. The limita-

tions of each model will be discussed with regard to that
model's adequacy to provide understanding of the four basic
defining characteristics

of the NP. This section constitutes

the main body of the thesis.

This evaluative discussion of

the theoretical/philosophical

inadequacies of each model is

intended to bring to light the process and strategies

(both

iii

explicit

and implicit)

which have evolved in the interpre-

tation of the image of man.

Mark J. Weaver

iv
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Metaphorical Interpretations

of the Neurotic Paradox

Problem
Psychology is in a crisis.

It is a conflict

which has

existed for some time and seems no closer to solution.
cause of the conflict

One

is the harsh debates between behavior-

ism, Freudianism, and humanism-existentialism.

AbrahamMaslow

calls these the three "forces" in psychology (1962, p. 9).
The charges and counter charges are not frivolous.
are valid, significant
which are difficult

and logical.

of the three major "forces

particularly
characteristics

11

in psychology is that each

has been shown to generate

inconsistencies.

in detail later.

They require answers

to achieve.

Another cause of the conflict

severe internal

They

These will be discussed

Briefly though, behaviorism, through its

narrow scientism,

has reduced away such human

as soul, consciousness, particularly

self-

consciousness, the self, mind and will, amongothers.
The paradox, to which this reductionism leads, is that it
i s difficult

for the behaviorist

to maintain that there

is a psychologist to have a psychology.
has developed internal
for instance,

problems.

Freudianisrn also

It has been demonstrated,

th.at one such problem is that Freud's constructs

cannot be translated

into scientific

language and therefore,

are untestable

(see Bandura & Walters, 1963; Berkowitz, 1970;

Singer, 1965; Silvennan, 1976).

This is true in spite of

Freud's strong contention that his theory is scientific.
It has been shown additionally,

by ThomasSzasz (1961)

and others, that Freud's "mental illness"
empirical.

postulate is not

No physical disease or trauma has been discovered.

The humanist-existentialist

"force" admits that

has become a problem in the field of psychology.

11

scientism

11

Therefore,

they prefer to take man as the image of man. But they have
been unable to establish

an epistemology which can furnish

an understanding of the self-reflexive

paradox encountered

when one takes this approach, or any of the other approaches
for that matter.

The problem stems from the paradox involved

in self-knowledge, that is, when man is both subject and
object to himself.

This paradox is a reality

which must

not be ignored if we hope to understand man.
Philosophers of science have found a way to assert that
paradox is not a serious problem in the physical sciences.
Whitehead and Russell's

theory of logical types reduced

the problem of paradoxes to "sort-crossing"
p. 37).

errors (1962,

P.,nyparadox, they hold, can be solved if it is

analyzed correctly

into its components and these are correctly

allocated to their proper domains or levels.
logy, the subject-object

But in psycho-

paradox cannot be so easily res.olve.d.

3

For instance,

the behaviorists,

who take the position of

the natural sciences most strongly,
in avoiding the self-referring

have been unsuccessful

paradox.

B.F. Skinner (1971}

has given us the most popular reductive definition
chology.

He says it is the study of behavior.

Laing points out,

of psy-

But R.D.

The other person I s· behavior is an

11

experience of mine. My behavior is an experience of the
other."

(_Laing, 1967, p. 17).

In other words, the study

of behavior is behavior and, therefore,

the psychologist

remains in the class which he studies.

So, we cannot ignore

the issue of the image of man because it is paradoxical.
The crucial category, for psychology, 11 wrote Rollo May,

11

11

is the self in relation
Still

to itself.

11

{_1967, p. 192).

another cause of the conflict in psychology is the

inadequate theoretical

development and technical progress

made by psycho1ogy as the

II

science of man.

11

hundred years of labor, even th.e scientific
11

After one
standing

of psychology is uncertain (Robinson, 1979, p. 5}.

11

Research

in psychology lacks consensus and overall guiding theory
(_Jordan, 1968).

Severa 1 things emerge as one thinks about

and experiences the conflict in psycho1ogy.

First,

it has

been, and continues to be, largely an epistemological
Whenman is the subject,

11

issue.

the proper understanding of science

leads unmistakably to the science of understanding,"

is the

4

interesting
247).

way Floyd Matson states this issue (1976, p.

Modern psychology was founded with the motive to be

a science.

However, the philosophy of science which has

been followed has become an issue itself.
positivistic,

The reductive,

mechanistic, summative or additive,

and categorical

linear

assumptions of science, each or in combina-

tions, create problems when applied to man in his attempt to
understand himself.
spirit,

soul, self,

(especially

The reductive effort did away with
personality,

self-consciousness),

creative thinking.

mind, consciousness
will, and original or

And what did psychology gain in exchange

for what it gave up? Psychology acauired a methodoloqy
and a hope.

The method, which was essentially

an epistemolo-

gical assumption, has been responsible for the reductive
effort.

The hope was founded upon the productivity

by the natural sciences.

shown

This productiveness ~as not been

forthcoming in psychology (Jordan, 1968).
Second, going behind th.e more obvious debates and frustrations

in psychology, Joseph Rychlak states, · At heart it
11

is the imaae of man which is at issue in psychology's internal conflict,
p. 2) ,,

let us make no mistake about that.

11

(1968,

An image of man, then, as I understand and use the

concept, is a complete or whole picture of man. Following
Rychlak's logic it is the mechanistic image of man assumed

5

by the behaviorists,

the sickness or illness

image of the

Freudians, and the seed or actor image of the humanist-existentialists

which forms the deeper issue in psychology.

The act of embracing one of the many alternative

images

of man and the implied social order is not primarily a
scientific

exercise.

As Matson has stated:

(it is) ...
an existential and moral
task: a challenge to each humanbeing to
forsake the passive posture of acquiescence before immutable cosmic law, so
long imposed upon us by religion and
science, and to assume the role of selfcreator--the maker of cultures and
shaker of foundations--which is no
1anger forbidden by the refonned
science of nature and is boldly encouraged
by the revitalized science of man.
(1976, pp. 12-13}
The attitude
simple critical

of this thesis is not meant to be one of
analysis and exclusion.

Indeed, the paradigms

treated in the text may not be wholly discarded on the basis
of any analysis.

Exclusion is not the goal of this paper.

It will be maintained that new and progressive meaning may be
found within the. existing models when viewed through the
perspective outlined in this thesis.

As ThomasKuhnob-

served:
Confronted with anomaly or with crisis,
scientists take a different attitude
toward existing paradigms, and tne nature of their research changes accordingly. (Kuhn, 1970, p. 90)

6

It is this change in attitude

which I aim toward, and I do

this by presenting a view of the theoretical/philosophical
implications which subtly underly the different

images or

metaphors for the understanding of humanbehavior as they
attempt to explain the specific category of Behavior known
as the neurotic paradox. While the case may at times appear
overstated,

it is presented with a gracious respect for the

meaning these paradigms carry in their approximations of
the understanding of humanbehavior.

Before proceeding,

however, it will be helpful to briefly review the position
being taken here about the process of asserting different
metaphors for the understanding of the image of man.
Conceptual Framework
Muchof the content and fonn of this thesis relies on
the following definitions:
Metaphor - A similarity

of relations

resulting

in

enhanced meaning through the j1J.xtaposition of two (or more}
images, fantasies,

ideas, concepts, events or things where

the person becomes aware, to some degree, of the relationships
generated by this dialectic

combinatorial activity.

The

metaphorizing process enables a person to interpret
unknown phenomenai'n terms of known phenomena. ( For

11

11

11

11

a full discussion of metaphor see Turbayne, 1962; Ricoeur,

7

1975.) An example of a metaphor currently employed by a
native American culture is the assertion

that the moon s
1

shape is like that of a bowl-like basket which changes its
orientation

in the sky to appear as it does.

phor would be the interpretation

of the brain as computer.

Model - An explicated metaphor.
set of relations.
or verbal.

Another meta-

A model is a delimited

It may be physical, pictoral,

f ormal,

The model of the moonmetaphor is the basket.

A more complicated model is that of the computer, with
multitudinous functions, memorycapacities,
associational

and infinite

pathways to explain the workings of the brain.

Myth - An expanded or amp1i fi ed metaphor.
of extended relations
large scope.

to express or establish

It is a set
meaning of

Truth, in an absolute sense, is not the pri-

mary issue in the use of this term.
meaningful relations.

The emphasis is upon

Myths usually entail relations

past, present and future in establishing

of the

meaning. An exampie

of a myth would be an Indian belief system that god places
his basket in the sky as the moon and occasionally shows his
displeasure by removing it from view (lunar eclipse).
involved and emotionally ·intense rituals

Often,

surround the myths

of all cultures.
Paradox -

11

•••

a contradiction

deductions from consistent premisis."

that follows correct
(Watzlawick,

Beavin, & Jackson, 1967, p. 188).
to relations

which are correctly

In this paper it refers
deduced (according to implicit

rules from a ge.neric and speci'fied s·et of relations

or explicit

but which are contradictory.

I use the term paradox in a

somewhat qualified manner here.

There are, in the literature

of philosophy, accounts· of great parado:xes encountered by men.
The intended use pres:ently does not cofoci de with the cl assica l meaning of logical paradox, nor does it refer to what
logicians have (for a long time) been referring

to as a

"reducti o ad absurdum.

11

Probably, Quine s (1966) description

of antinomy comes

1

closest to what is mearit here by the term paradox.
antinomy produces a self-contradiction
reasoning.

11

(Quine, 1966, p. 7) .

necessarily

this distinc-

paradox, which

includes a fallacy in the proof.

paradox connotes a "surprise"

An

by accepted ways of

He furthers

tion by comparing antinomy to falsidical

11

A falsidical

in meaning, which disappears

when the underlying fallacy is solved.

An antinomy, though,

carries with it a "surprise" which may be accorrmodated only
be repudiating part of our conceptual heritage.
t~is function precisely which distinguishes
paradox assumed here.

It is

the meaning of

9

....
antimony (paradox) establishes that some tacit and trusted
pattern of reasoning must be made
explicit and be henceforward avoided
(Quine, 1966, p. 13)
or revised.
The "tacit and trusted pattern of reasoning" corresponds
with "premise" as used by Watzlawick in his definition
cited above.
It is with the above qualifications

that the te-nn

paradox i s implemented in this discussion .
The creation and utilization

of symbols is regarded by

most as a uniquely humanprocess (Cassirer,

1946; Klee &

Schrickel, 1963; Langer, 1942; Maddi, 1970; White, 1949).
The implementation of these symbols (or metaphors) often
takes the form of cognitive metaphorizing.

Take, for in-

stance, the following line of thought as an example of this
intellectual

process:
If you program the environment effectively, humanbehavior can be seen as
mechanically responding to antecedent
and consequent stimuli in an understandable and predictable fashion.
Therefore, man is like a machine.

Note the assumptions which are interjected

in this metaphor

about behavior th-rough the 1anguage ( behaviori sti c in this
example) employed by the metaphorizer.
the definition

Referring back to

of metaphor above, machines with their

structures

and functions constitute

the "known" phenomenain

this metaphor, human behavior the "unknown."
Meaning and meaningfulness are contextual and relational.
"Weunderstand something by referring

to something we already

know.'' (Sch.liermacher quoted in Palmer, 1969, p. 87).
Meaning is thus defined as the perception of relations;
relations

made possible by the dialectical

interaction

different

elements or frames of reference in our envfron-

ment. Meaning is merely the name given to different
of relationships

of

kinds

recognized in the process of dialectical

interaction.
An important observation about this process is that there
is an irreducible
experience of it.

difference between the world and our
Th.at is, humanbeings living in a "real

world" do not operate directly

or immediately upon that

world, but rather construct a model, or representation

of

their experience that functions to generate and guide their
behavior.

Our representation

of the world determines to a

large degree what our experience of the world will be, how
we will perceive the world, and what choices we will see
available

to us as we live in the world.
It must be rememberedthat the object of the
world if ideas as a whole is not the portrayal
of reality--this
would be an utterly impossible task--but rather to provide us with
an instrument for finding our way about more
easily in the world. (Vaihinger, 1924, p. 15)

11

The position being taken here is based on the assumption
that even though the model is not an accurate portrayal
of reality,

it does, however, represent some similarity

to

what is real.
A map (model) is. not the territory it
represents but, if correct, it ~as a
si milar structure to the territory,
which accounts for its usefu 1ness.
(Korzybski, 1933, pp. 59-60)
11

Following these premises, it is not surpdsing

that

no two humanbeings. have exactly the same experiences;
therefore,

each of us may create a different

model of the

world we share and come to live in a different
(_SeeW.V. Quine's philosophical
translation

11

reality .

11

discussion of radical

as a basis for the possibility

of differences

between the conceptual schemes of people, Word and Object,
Chapter 2, 1960.)

If we learn to view another person's

behavior (thoughts, feelings,

acts) in the context of the

choices generated by th.eir particular

model, then we may

see them not as sick, crazy, or bad.

Rather, they may

be seen as making the best choices they are aware of, the
best choice available to them in their model of the world.

1

Wh.tle this. leads into a currently busy area of inquiry
and research relative

to the application

of th.ese ideas. to

1This observation has. also been made by Bandler and
Grinder. See their book The Structure of Magic, for a
similar discussion.
(Bandler & Grinder, 1975, Vol. I, pp. 1-4)

12

psychotherapy, the focus here is on the implicatfons for
theorizers

in metaphorizing about human behavior out of their

experiential
instance,

models of reality.

The ideas of Freud, for

as one who theorized about the etiology of aberrant

behavior , maybe seen in this light.

The observation has

been made by many that the importance and centrality

of

sex in his model of neurosis may be associated with the
extreme sexual repression he witnessed in his day.

The

myth (expanded, amplified metaphor) evolving from his
work that sex plays such a pervasive role in neuroses has
survived to the present, despite the claims to the contrary
from current professionals.
The conviction that human beings possess this novel
capacity to manipulate symbols--to metaphorize--rests

in

the writings of some contemporary language theorists

which

suggest that language is essentially

metaphorical in its

nature and development (Campbell, 1975; Frentz, 1974).
Suzanne Langer has suggested that "a metaphor is the law of
growth of every semantic .
principle"

(1942, p. 119).

not a development, but a
In her extended discussion of

language she observes that,
Language is a vast repository of
"faded metaphors," i.e. words originally used in a metaphoric sense
which have not acquired the abstract relational meaning they first
metaphorically suggested ...

13

metaphor is the force that makes
language essentially relational,
intellectual,
forever showing up
new abstractable forms of reality."
(Langer, 1942, p. 115)2
This theory that language is essentially

metaphorical

is, in turn, grounded in the school of neurophysiology which
assumes that symbolization is an inherent function of the
nervous system, that the nervous system does not return
direct

impressions of the external world, but indirect

symbolic representations

(Gordon, 1961, p. 111}. This

theory further maintains that the rudimentary symbolization
process of the nervous system is elaborated on higher and
higher levels, culminating in the cortex of the brain. 3
Thus, when this argument is extended, language is asserted
to have its roots in metaphor and through metaphor in the
rich, symbol-generating nervous system.
The position

being taken here, then, is that the process

of metaphorizing is fundamentally a mental principle

(in-

herent in language and grounded in the nervous system) and

2For a further di.scussion of the evolution of words via
metaphoric extension, see Barfield, 1926.
3Maddi has developed his theory of personality under
the assumption that th.e human needs to symbolize, imagine,
and judge fn order to fee 1 sat1'sfied and avoid frustration
because that is the nature of his organism (Maddi, 1970).
In addition, there is some research (Reisen, 1961) indicating
that the use of neural structures is necessary in fnfancy
if they are to develop normally.

14

is essential

in creating meaning from experience and in

constructing

behavior-directing

models.

The use of metaphors in conceptual functioning as well
as theoretical

activity

has been favorably argued from a

general philosophical standpoi nt by Cassirer (1953-1957).
Mehrabian (1968) presents a discussion on the use of basic
metaphors and examples of their use in personali"ty theory.
While much has been written about the use of metaphor within
many disciplines,

a review of what has been the history and

development of this work goes well beyond the scope of this
paper.

What is appropriate to mention are some of the
dangers around the use of metaphor. 4
The power of metaphor has been emphasized by Pepper
(1942)

in his discussion of ''root metaphors" (pp. 239-40).

For instance,
interrelates

in the work of Kurt Lewin, the network that
words like field,

force, boundary, fluidity,

etc.,

vector, phase-space, tension,
is a metaphorical under-

standing of perception which pervasively colors his theory.
The more powerful metaphors serve to organize pieces into
paradigms.

Black {_1962), in his article

"Models and Meta-

phors (cited in Ricoeur, 1975, p. 243) points out two
11

4For a comprehensive. annotated bibliograph.y and history
of metaphor, see Sh_ibles, 1971. An excellent scholastic work
on metaphor may be found in Paul Ricoeur s book The Rule of
Metaphor which. takes a multidisciplinary
look at the creation
of meaning in language (1975).
1

15

powerful characteristics
"radical"

of these metaphors:

and "systematic" aspects.)

their

Idealistic

empiri-

cism holds that one need only to subject his theories and
hypotheses to empirical scrutiny and then test his observations against statistical

probability

usefulness in describing reality,
1

question, his perceptions,
1

there is much more than

The e.xperimenter s framing of the research

meets the eye.

'

to verify their

and his interpretations

of the

raw data are all subject to the metaphorical bias he holds
11

in reference to his work.

In agreement with Pepper (.1942}

it is suggested here that a metaphor or analogy (Simon &
Newell, 1963) typically
(i.e.

determines the kind of theory

as~umptions, and hypotheses ) which under-

categories,

lies observation and description.
A related danger concomitant with the process of metaphorizing is the tendency to confuse theory based on metaphor with "reality"
the territory
tization

or

11

fact."

This mistakfog the map for

is called reification

(Sarbin, 1967)., hyposta-

(Turbayne, 1962), or misplaced concretion (Whitehead,

1948).
Paul Ricoeur had these words to say about this danger:
A lfoe of demarcation should be drawn
between "to use' and "to be used," lest
we fall victim to metaphor, mistaking
the mask for the face. In brief, we must
"expose metaphor, unmask it. This proximity between use and abuse leads to a
1

11

correction of the metaphors about
metaphor.
. . . facts are rea 11ocated by metaphor; but such reallocation is also a misallocation.
Metaphor has been compared to a filter,
a screen, and lens, in order to say
that it places things under a perspective and instructs us to "see as
"to explode a myth"
is to expose the model for the metaphor. . .. critical consciousness
of the distinction between use and
abuse leads not to disuse but to reuse of metaphors, in the endless
search for other metaphors, namely a
metaphor that would be the best one
possible.
(Ricoeur, 1975, pp. 252-3)
11

Given these dangers then, of allowing experience to
be interpreted

for us by the metaphors we embrace, of mis-

taking the metaphor for reality,

of being used by metaphor,

what can we do to escape our own delimited worlds?
answer, I believe,

lies partly in the sort of critical

thinking on a philosophical

level as follows in an analysis

of the extant metaphorical interpretations
seen as painful,
greatest

self-inflicted,

thing by far,"

of metaphor."

of human behavior

and problematic.

said Aristotle,

(Turbayne, 1962, p. 21).

and re-interpretation

"The

"is to be master
This sort of review

does not assemble empirical studies

and perform meta-anaiyses of data.
philosophical

The

This is a theoretical/

work reaching toward the assumptions under-

lying such research.

17

The Neurotic Paradox
Having stated the thesis that theori"es attempting to
accurately

define the image of man are essentially

metaphori-

cal, and that the models rooted in these metaohors carry
with them certain

inherent dangers, the assumptfon to be

added is that the conflict
may be seen to

in osychology as described earlier

be intimately

related to this.

It would be

an enormous task to undertake an analysis of the major
11

forces" in psychology on the whole.

It can be realistically

and relevant l y explored, however, through an analysis of how
the major models of human behavio~ based on their

respec-

tive metaphorical images, farein a theoretical/ohilosophical
analysis of how adequately they each provide understanding
of a specific

category of human behavior kno\'mas the neurotic

p~radox (NP). The strengths and weaknesses of the various
models will be stated.
The NP is simply that some peoole who are assumed to
be motivated by pleasure often exhibit behavior which
brings about personal suffering and defeat.

Apparently,

these people are unable to change their behavior and to
prevent pain from recurring.

The title

was formally

assigned by O. Hobart Mowrer (1948) in his analysis and
critique

of Freud's writings.

Interest

in this behavior does not derive simply from

18

seeing man suffering or being defeated.

Most people are able

to conceive of and admit their weaknesses in the face of
powerful natural and social forces with which they must
contend.

Defeat is a humiliating,

destructive

painful,

and a potentially

outcome. Both psychology and theology have

addressed themselves to the effects of defeat upon a life.
A number of metaphors , models, and myths of human behavi or
concern themselves with the human spirit

as it faces over-

whelming odds and someti mes succumbs. We see var i ous images
of heroic and tragic people.

But defeat is not the exact

focus of the behavior to be discussed in this paper.
Suffering and defeat are not paradoxical in themselves.
Of greater fascination
psychologists,

for man, to himself and for

has been suffering and defeat in which the

individual is personally involved:
been exceptionally

difficult

of personally inflicted

self-defeat.

It has

for man to grasp the meaning

suffering.

Such behavior seems to

border on insanity" because it cha 11enges the va1i dity of
II

some of our fundamental rationalistic

assumptions.

Of almost total perplexity to the humanmind is the
behavior of repetitive
tive self-defeat.

self-inflicted

suffering and repeti-

Not only do some people defeat themselves,

but they wil 1 repeat th.e same behavior.
Defeat surely is a wound to the humanspirit;

self-defeat

19

or self-punishment is almost mentally incomprehensible;
but, repetitive

self-defeat

seems beyond understanding.

is paradoxical for it leads to contradictory

It

conclusions -

from logical deductions drawn from our commonperceptual
and conceptual backgrounds.

It is this repetitive

defeating paradoxical behavior which is of specific

selfinterest

presently.
There is yet another provocative and paradoxical thing
about repetitive
sometimes

self-inflicted

appear

suffering.

These people

to be creative and they often seem to

be ahead of the masses, predictively
which the society or culture may go.

pointing the way in
Rollo May (1969)

and Norman0. Brown (_1959) have written about such paradoxical behavior and its relation
for, creativity
of a society.

and predictive

to, if not the foundation

understanding of the future

Maywrote, "The problems of ( our day) have a

curious characteristic

not yet adequately appreciated:

They pre di ct the future."

(_May,1969, p. 18).

"Art and neurosis both have a predictive

Again,

function."

(May,

1969, p. 21).

The writings of philosopher Michael Polanyi provide
an explanation which is very helpful in understanding this
creative and predictive
normal and neurotic.

characteristic
The predictive

of some behavior, both
nature of neurosis may
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be seen as follows:
science, a society,

Whena relational
or a personality)

system (a logic, a
has been thoroughly

exploited in terms of its seminal, generative,
relations,

discoverable

the limits of the underlying generic relational

set begin to emerge. At this stage, the emergence of the
limits of a system tend to take the form of paradoxical
deductions (see Polanyi, 1951, 1959, 1969) . These paradoxes
emerge from the generic set of relations
in the direction

of potential

but they also point

resolutions

and/or solutions.

This process, I believe, may be seen in the functioning
of the neurotic personality
shifting

as well as in the historical

of paradigms within the sciences.

fo 11owing the conceptua 1 structure

behaviors (acts,
structure

feelings)

The deductions

of a theory, or the

based on an existing personality
1

may eventually become anomalous (to use Kuhn s

terminology);
to a crisis,

inconsistent

in some way and perhaps lead

or a neurotic way of behaving.

an indication that the limitations
system are emerging.

This is

within the relational

Newmeaning is needed.

People at

the point of paradox, who live with it, through it, and begin
to solve it (rather than escape from it),
future by opening up possibilities.

Man, therefore,

viewed here as a transcending organism.
inconsistencies

build the
is

The nature of the

(anomalies, contradi"ctions,

antimonies,
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paradoxes) provides clues as to the needed modification of
the existing

relational

system, or the creation and imple-

mentation of a new metaphor.
An additional
ll970).

element of understanding comes from Kuhn

It may be as Kuhn suggests that when the paradoxical

stage is reached it takes a new metaphor to unleash creative
progress and to provide the solutions to such paradoxes.
But before new metaphors can be used, the hold of previous
metaphors must be broken.
to the crisis

This conflict

can be seen as similar

which the neurotic person feels . Accepting

Polanyi and Kuhn s interpretations
1

explanation of the predictive

provides a specific

nature of neurotic behavior.

In summary, an adequate model of the behavior upon which
we are focusing will need to be able to explain the following defining characteristics

of the NP:

(1)

Self-inflicted

suffering and defeat,

(2)

Repetitiveness

of self-defeating

behavior,

(3) The paradoxical nature of the behavior,
(4) The creative and predictive

potential

of the behavior.

In the following sections of this paper will be found
analyses intended to show h.owneurotic behavior has been
interpreted

by the prominent extant models.

Through the

centuries models of man have been drawn from relatively
few metaphors.

The major ones have been Spirit,

Disease,
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Machine, and Seed (see Langer, J.,
1968, for further

discussion

1969; and Mehrabian,

of these basic metaphors and

examples of their use in personality

theory).

Specifically,

these metaphors have been implemented to state that:
(1)

The relation

between a person and his behavior

is like the relation
which inhabits
(2)

The relation

between behavior and a spirit

a person (Spirit).
between a person and his behavior

is like the relation

between a disease and the

symptoms (Freud, 1964).
(3)

The relation

between a person and his behavior

is like the relation

between a machine and its

action or product (Skinner, 1971).
(4)

The relation

between a person and his behavior

is like the relation
or fruit

between a seed and a flower

(Maslow, 1962).

The limitations

of each metaphor will be discussed

with regard to that model's adequacy to provide understanding
of the four basic defining characteristics
are listed

above.

Inhabitation

Model of the Neurotic Paradox (Spiri .t Metaphor)

This historically
not in model form.
of models.

of the NP which

earliest

interpretation

of the NP was

It existed before men understood the use
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In terms of early attitudes
tively exhibited self-destructive

about persons who repetibehaviors, which they

seemingly could not change, they were considered to be
ignorant, mistaken, cheating, or sinning (Alexander &
Selesnick, 1966).

It was assumed, probably on the basis of

a combination of Greek and Christian thought, that if these
people were ignorant or mistaken they should be instructed
and they would, natura1ly
behavior.

and rationally , change their

If they were cheating they would be punished and

they would change to avoid pain.
Inhabitation

Model

If the self-defeating
spite of corrective
and restitution,
earlier

repetitive

instruction,

behavior continued in

punishment, or confession

it was easy to fall back to an historically

understanding in which the fundamental model was

possession or inhabitation.
For centuries,

we conjecture,

man had attempted to

understand his own mysterious self through metaphors drawn
from humanexperiences with inanimate objects and physical
movements. The primary relationship

was that things move.

Menexperienced th.emmove, but did not experience why
they moved or the causal relationships
ments.

between their move-

Consequently, man created a metaphori'cal relati'on

and projected the experience he had of himself as a mover.
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Physical objects became inhabited in the same way as man
felt he inhabited his body and, within it, made things move.
However, when men could not understand their own actions and
movements, the projection was introjected
and man himself became inhabited.

metaphorically

These spirits

man to do paradoxical things like repetitively
(Alexander & Selesnick,

caused
hurt himself

1966).

The basic model was inh.abitation by a s-pir-ft .

The

fundamental metaphor was one between inner feelings of
causing one's self to move and inanimate movements. Expanded, this metaphor became the mythology of spooks, spirits,
and ghosts.
Even from a traditional

Christian position affinning

the existence of God, the model does not essentially

change,

Satanic forces are the cause of this kind of behavior.

The

problem remains how to deal with Satan's inhabitation.
Exorcism became the

11

therapy.

11

experts emerged in the form of priests

To help the process,
and their perversion

into magicians (Goshen, 1967).
Inhabitation Mode
.l and the Defining Characteristics of the NP
Now, if we compare this model to the four defining
characteristics
interesting

of paradoxical neurotic behavior, some

implications

arise.
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Self-inflicted

behavior.

The self-inflicted

nature of

suffering and defeat are denied and logical and rational
assumptions about man are maintained.

This is a strong

element which supported this model in an interesting
It is rational

and logical if not empirical.

way.

(It is interest-

ing to note that this model also takes the responsibility
good, healthy behavior away from the self,

for

apart from sin.)

Repetitive behavior , The repetitiveness

of the behavior

is placed outside the person and beyond the.ir immediate
control.

However, they do remain partially

culpable in

the sense that they may be responsible for becoming reprobate enough for a spirit

to enter.

Andfreedom could be

obtained for a remedy is available.
and restitution.

The remedy is penance

Repetition of a behavior, thus, is un-

necessary and not paradoxical,
Paradoxical behavior.

but sinful.

The paradoxical appearance

of the behavior disappears since it is explained.
paradox is given ontological
mythological level.

status.

The

It is raised to the

Opposing gods are in serious conflict.

Man is in some respects a helpless onlooker.
expected to be rationally

and logically

unless he is reprobate and inhabited.

But he is

on the side of good
Then he can do those

things necessary to regain his placement on the s:ide of
good.
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Creative and predictive

behavior-

also explained in this model.
the will and intentions

This behavior is

It is moved to the level of

of the inhabiting spirit

(which is

understood in terms of a developed mythology) and the will
and intentions
the gods.

of a man in herioc struggle with or against

One needs little

grasp the stability

more information to begin to

and power of this model and its ability

to be creative and predictive
lived it out.

regarding future life.

Men

The bel i ef system was consistent and coherent.

Critique of the Inhabitation Model
As this model was explored and exploited over the centuries,

its finite

limits began to be encountered.

Dif-

ferent metaphors and models were proposed and paradoxes
began to be generated.
be realistically

There are more of these than can

considered here.

are that the model essentially
and irresponsible,

Somemajor parado~es

makes man both responsible

it treats man both as rational

and

irrational,

and it emphasizes spirit

as real and the real

as spirit.

It gives meaning to how men become possessed

with such strange behavior.
This model essentially
level where the conflict
looks on as a victim.

moves the NP to the mythological

takes place between the gods.
It is necessary to note that this

movementof the paradox to the mythological level is the

Man
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fundamental solution provided by this interpretation

of the

NP.

The Spirit model may sound outmoded and unbelievable.
Science has been able to show us, through a different
metaphor, what most of the physical movementsare, and has
even demythologized man and his own movements. The need
for anthropomorphic projections

has greatly diminished.

However, these metaphors are not completely dead.

As long

as science has not shown the complete interrelations
universe we will have some mystery.

of the

On this basis, the

fundamental power of the spiritualistic

metaphors will

remain and men will use them to understand.
It would be very incorrect to believe that the spiritualistic

metaphor has eroded because it has been dis-

proved or because it does not work. As provocative to the
scientific

mind as it may be, it is a testimonial

fact that

on the basis of this model, through logic, punishment,
exorcism or penance, for example, people do modify their
behavior.

They become dispossessed.

We are presently undergoing a resurgence of the popuof this metaphor-model-myth. This is seen in the

larity
interest

in things like UFO's, the occult,

other religions,

ESP, Zen Buddhism,

drugs, and meditation (Samples, 1976).

\.Jhat is being asserted here as a major h.ypothesis of
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this paper is that any model will explain and it will be
effective

as long as it stands in a united, consistent,

coherent, and socially accepted fashion.

The logical and

psychological integr'fty of the metaphor and the subsequent
models and myths built upon it, taken together or separately,
give it meaning and power.
Old metaphors are not disproved, they are replaced. 5
Whenan existing model is exploited to its limits a new
metaphor has a chance to replace it.
chanistic)

metaphors have split

The scientific

the spiritualistic

(memetaphor-

model-myth complex and it has began to erode.
Wewould guess that if the integrity

of the spiritualis-

tic metaphor could be restored and strengthened,
individual or a society,

its therapeutic

for an

and explanatory

processes would again be effective.
Freudian Model of the Neurotic Paradox (Disease Metaphor)
It was Freud who provided the vocabulary and delineated
the modern problem knownas the NP. Instead of searching
through all of Freud's writing,

to follow the development of

the NP in his theory, the reader is referred to Thompson
(J957) and Ricoeur (1970).

In his early clinical

and

5Isreal Scheffler, in his book Science and Subjectivity
(.1967), has disputed this view of science held 5y ThomasKuhn,
amongothers. His cl aims in defense of "objectivity" are
answered by Kuhn in a postscript to the 1970 edition of
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.
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theoretical
tific

experience, Freud had taken mechanistic, scien-

(medical}, and hedonistic positions.

life drive (libido)

followed the

worked mechanically (medically

11

The fundamental

pleasure principle

and biologically) .

11

and

A mechan-

i stic-medical model has the three necessary elements:
a specific

disease or trauma, (2) a specific

(J}

course, (3)

a specific outcome. Knowledgeof these three things makes
it possible to develop a specific

intervention.

These as-

sumptions and this model guided Freud's work even though he
didn't think in terms of models.
Freud was an acute and honest observer even if his
observations were contradictory

to his assumptions.

He

began to notice persons who exhibited behaviors which seemed
counter to the "pleasure principle."
World War I veterans who would re-live
and do so repetitively
nized other patients

These were cases of
their experiences

and with much pain.

He also recog-

such as hysterics who seemingly had no

discoverable organic disease but who complained of physical
suffering.

Freud was motivated to develop a theoretical

position which could explain these behaviors because they
seemed so contradictory
could not be interpreted
sure).

to his assumptions.

This behavior

as sexual wish fulfillment

(plea-

This was why Freud saw this behavior as paradoxical.
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Solution to NP
There are three elements in Freud's solution to the
NP. Twoelements were theoretical.

Tnese were thoroughly

explicated by Freud. These were 1) the idea that symptoms
are defenses binding anxiety over repressed wishes and
fantasies;

and later 2) the death instinct

They are in the realm of focal
11

That is, these theorizations
intell ectual attention
of the gestaltist,

11

(Thanatos).

knowledge (Polanyi, 1951).

were the objects of conscious

and manipulation.

they provide the

11

In the language

figure

in Freud's

11

thought on which attention

is drawn, against a backdrop

of unnoticed assumptions.

\~e will return to these.

third element was subtle and essentially
knowledge (Polanyi, 1951}.

a shift in

of tacit

1

a-critical,

11

tacit

11

11

knowledge specifies

Indeed,
that is is

not subject to the scrutiny and analysis which

focal awareness necessarily

includes.

Freud's Tacit Paradigm Shift
Freud's tacit

solution was essentially

through authoritarian
11

science

11

11

This provided the ground or

backdrop to Freud's thought and was not explicated.
Polanyi s definition

The

accomplished

assertion and rhetoric based upon

and the medical model (Szasz, 1961).

went as follows:

The theory

During infancy, behaviors are emitted

on the basis of the pleasure principle

(Idl.

However,
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the parents begin to "s.ocialize" the ch"fld by punishing
forbidden actions (even thoughts) .
conflict

between the pleasure prindple

develops.

and reality

principle

The child must learn to suppress or repress his

"bad impulses and/or find socially
11

them.

Thus, a fundamental

approved ways to express

.A.11of this is for the purpose-of maximizing pleasure

and reducing pain.
There is one drive which was rigorously socialized

in

Freud's day and in regard to which it was not easy to find
socially

approved outlets.

interpreted

This is sex.

Freud initially

this problem in a narrow medical model. Severe

socialization

and/or sexual molestations

Freud actually

cause trauma.

sought for the organic damage caused in this

way. He believed this damage created the symptomsof neurosis
and if he could have found it he would have been able to
fulfill

the requirements of the medical model. He was not

able to accomplish this.
Freud was a creative thinker.

Whenhe began to realize

that the traumatic experiences which his patients
might be fantasies
his theory.

the world.

or wishes he followed this data and modified

However, he never changed the "tacitly

medical hypothesis:

reported

the

11

11

held

ground from which he perceived
11

Patients continued to be looked upon as sick

with all the privileges

pertaining to this status.
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Th_is

11

tacit

11

shift was the une.xplicated aspect of

Freud s solution to the NP. Szasz (1961} believes that
1

Freud took this attitude

from Charcot.

However Freud

came upon it, he was a major contributor
social and cultural

success.

to its eventual

The triumph of this new para-

digm was based upon the authority exerted by science and
medicine--not new knowledge or truth.

The philosophical

assumptions were never changed. For this reason, however,
1

Freud s theory became a mtxed model (one built upon a
hybrid of two metaphors:

the disease and the spirit)

which generated many contradictions.
Freud contributed to the erosion of the spiritualistic
model by movfng "tacit

11

understanding from spirit

to medicine.

The medical model called for a new approach to treatment
much more in line with modern scientific

assumptions.

1

Freud s Early Explication of the NP
The first

explicit

following direction:
or inconsistent,

interpretation

If punishment was traumatically

severe

the child developed a life style fn which

repression and the reality
significant

of the NP took the

principle dominate.

Freud s
1

insight was that in this condition, the energy

of the pleasure principle

is not reduced and it tends to

return from the unconscious in disguised fonns (wishes,
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fantasies,

and indirect

behaviors) in an attempt to re-live

and master or undo the original
trauma.

problematic situation

or

This was referred to as the return of the repressed

and is his earliest

model of the NP. Since the returned

material is socially condemnedand it is no longer under the
subject's

conscious control,

the person will repetitively

find himself in painful traumatic situations.

Symptomsare

behaviors which reduce the anxiety of this situation
which do not solve the underlying repression.

but

Thus, this

is an anxiety reduction and avoidance model.
Whenrepression is relatively

weak, the forbidden

impulses may threaten to merge into conscious awareness.
Th_eperson may then unconsciously administer self-punishment.
This behavior will also appear to the subject as beyond his
own control.
a spiritualistic

He may even feel inhabited and be drawn into
interpretation

of his behavior.

Freud's Later Explication of the NP
The second solution of the NP is an extension of the
first.

As Freud continued to work with WWIveterans and

hysteric patients it became more difficult
theoretically

for him to

account for the self-inflicted

suffering

through the model of the "return of the repressed."
drive and energy toward self-destruction
versal and more persistent

The

seemed more uni-

than the model could explain,
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especially

as the role of wish and fantasy came to dominate

his thinking.

Consequently, he posited another

or basic energy.

11

instinct

11

This he called Thanatos, the death drive.

In proposing a death drive, in conflict

with the life

drive, Freud resolves th.e NP by making it an ontological

prob-

lem. He actually perfonns the same maneuver that th.e
spiritualistic

interpreters

did.

He moved the solution to

the mythological level.
Freud was able to show how patients
11

suffering from the

return of the repressed" could be treated through techniques

to lift

the repression.

ontological

conflict

ingly became directly
tribution

However, he did not resolve the

between Eros and Thanatos.
interested

He increas-

in mythology and its con-

to understanding th.is conflict.

Individual neuro-

sis became universal social neurosis.
Freud not only maintained that human
history can be understood only as a neurosis
but also that the neurosis of individuals
can be understood only in the context of
human history as a whole. (Brown, 1959,
p. 12)

Freudian Model and the Defining Characteristics of the NP
Nowlet us examine the Freudian model in light of the
four defining elements of the NP which have been listed.
Self-inflicted

behavior.

The pain of neurosis is

explained through the return of the repressed,
development of symptomswhich are essentially

and the
avoidance
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techniques.

The symptomrepresents both the biologically

fundamental libidinal
inflicted

gratification

by the super-ego.

and the imposed suffering

Society becomes the vi 11i an.

The neurotic is not possessed, he is not a sinner, he is a
victim who has fallen ill because of traumatic repressive
actions done unto him. He is ill.

Thus, it tutns out that

the suffering is not basically self-inflicted

and the indi-

vidual is not responsible for his condition.
In this interpretation

the logical,

rational,

and self-

responsible elements of personality are reduced to a rigid
determinism.
free.

Han is free from the paradox, but not personally

Manis an organism which stands in eternal danger from

the conflicts

of his own drives.

R~petitive behavior.
repetitiveness

Freud's model explains the

of neurotic behavior by pointing out the

need to undo or master a previously traumatic 1ife event by
repeating it.

But this is done unconsciously through

symptomsand the situation

is never really solved.

Later,

Freud began to believe that this tendency to repeat may be
stronger than the pleasure principle.

He then selected the

model of the tendency of organic life to return to the
inorganic state from which it came. Thus, repetitiveness.
becomes an ontological problem. The repetitiveness
logical and beyond man's control.

is onto-

It is a biological and
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determined action about which man has no choice.
solved, but a larger problem is created.
his aggressive destructive
Paradoxical behavior.

The NP is

Howcan man control

tendencies?
The paradox of the NP is re-

solved in the Freudian model. However, it is resolved in a
curious manner. Typically, behavior i.s first
biological language.

reduced to a

However, the language turns out not to

be the model-level language Freud claimed, but mythologicallevel language.

Consequently, it is fair to assert that the

paradox is actually resolved by moving it to a mythological
level.
Creative and predictive
Freud was identical
cause for illness

behavior.

to illness,
is repression.

Creativity

or neurosis.

for

The general

Creativity

can happen

when reason is relaxed and the unconscious can tell its
truth (Rieff, 1959, p. 90); or, when the person regresses
and the truth escapes.

Creativity of a person remains an

ideosyncratic symptomfor Freud (Arieti,
The creativity

and predictability

1976, p. 24).
of the Freudian

model really rests upon the success of the
shift which Freud accomplished.

tacit

11

11

paradigm

The explicated models

end in pessimistic predictions only.

This shift was

successful through mixing models even though it may have
been unintentional.
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Therefore, according to the hypothesis of this paper,
the Freudian model became effective

because the disease

metaphor and the generated model and myth came to

11

stand

11

within society.
There is no denying the creative and predictive impact
of psychoanalysis upon society.

It is seen in art,

litera-

ture, education, child rearing, business, advertising,
even religion.

Even the pessimistic conflict

and

between life

and death seems predictive enough to worry many people.
Critique of the Freudian Model
As psychoanalytic theory has been amplified and exploited
over the years its limits are being exposed.

Freudian thought

is an exasperating mixture of realism and idealism, biology
and mythology, detenninis.m and teleology,
ism and irrationalism,

logic and rational-

and many others.

The most surprising thing which emerges from this
analysis is that Freud's method of solving the NP is not
different

from that of the spiritualistic

resolution.

Both

models use avoidance explanations and fundamentally move
the NP to the mythological level to solve it.

Even for

Freud the struggle eventually is between the gods.

Even if

we grant that Freud wants to use the mythologies metaphorically,

the method is suspect to the scientific

Freud's model never

seems to get legitimately

mind.
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reinterpreted
satisfactory

into physical and biological
nature to the scientist.

language of a

On the other hand,

Freud's denial about his gods is never quite enough for
the spiritualists

and there is a suspicion that psycho-

analysis may be a religion after all.
Behavioral Model of the Neurotic Paradox (Machine Metaphor)
The mechanistic model will now be considered in conjunction with scientific

pbilos ·ophy and methodology, as it

was the model which superceded the spirit
tacitly

metaphor and

supported the psychoanalytic model on scientific
11

(if not medical) ground.

The mythology of behaviorism contains

philosophical assumptions which deny the possibility
genuine or realistic

paradoxes.

metaphors (Turbayne, 1962)..

excesses, or mixed

Science is assumed to be

based upon realism, logical positivism,
linear assumptions, Aristotelean

operationalism,

logic, mechanism, and

induction (_Maslow,1966, p. 72ff).
behaviorists

of

Paradoxes are mistakes,

incorrect operations of logic, linguistic

attitudes,

11

In spite of these

were unable to ignore the NP.

Early Behavioral Model
A primary principle of learning,

according to behavioral

learning theory, is that emitted behavior v1hich is rewarded
will be repeated.

Skinner's radical behaviorism focuses
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more on the R in Watson's S-R (stimulus-response)
B.F. Skinner's

0953} system of operant conditioning is a

descriptive

behaviorism devoted entirely

responses.

He flatly

11

11

mentalistic

utilizes

rejects

to the study of

the language of subjective

concepts and leans so extremely toward an

empirical tradition
theoretical

formula.

that he maintains he does not need a

framework. Consequently, his behavioral model

inductive reasoning which leads itsproponents

conclude that what is true of certain

to

individual cases is

true of all cases, or what is true at certain times , wi ll be
true under the same circumstances at all times.
deduction is the process which starts
or propositions

In contrast,

with certain premises

and attempts to draw valid conclusions from

them. NoamChomsky(1979) addresses the problems inherent
in Skinner's inductive aoproach by questioning the
generality

of application

relatively

restricted

of concepts derived from the

type of behavior that Skinner has

studied in his experimental programs.
A second primary principle

of Skinner s brand of
1

behaviorism is that behaviors which are unrewarded should
extinguish (Sk.i nner, 1953l.

The occurrence of negative

reinforcement is dis:tingui sh.ed from puni shme.nt in that th.e
negative reinforcer

(or aversive stimulus) increases the

strength of the operant behavior to avoid that stimulus.
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The NP stated in this language is:

Whydoes behavior,

motivated by reinforcing consequences, not discontinue where
it in fact leads the organism into punishment or pain?
Negative reinforcement should prevent the recurrence of
such behavior, or in the absence of a reward--extinction
should lead to an ending of the behavior.
The explanation of this seemingly paradoxical behavior
hinges on the hypothesis of avoidance response.

Exti'nction

is an active process and occurs only in the presence of the
conditioned stimulus (.CS)without reinforcement (_negative CS
in this case).

If the organism is allowed to avoid the

CS it will never learn that the punishment will not follow.
Thus, the behavior will never extinguish.
But why does the avoidance response itself
extinguish?

never

Because the CS (_situation} causes an increase

in drive (negative autonomic nervous system response} and
avoidance causes a reduction in drive.

This reduction is a

positive reinforcement for avoidance behavior.

Therefore,

the avoidance response is continuously reinforced and the
original conditioned response cannot extinguish.
Temporal factors are important in this solution.

If

the avoidance response can be delayed until non-punishment
occurs, or a counter-response is elicited,
or counter-conditioning may take place.

then extinction,
In other words,
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long-tenn pleasure is given up in favor of sh.ort-tenn
pleasure (Mowrer, 1948).
For the behaviorist,

using this solution to the NP and

the assumptions of this philosophy of science, neurosis fs
a mistake based upon avoidance behavior.
Mowrers Critique of the Avoidance Model
1

Mowrerhas lead a concerted attack against both Freudianism
and Skinner's naive behaviorism.

He believes the two

solutions to the NP are not essentially

different

since. they

both are avoidance models.
Perhaps Mowrer's most direct point is that both approaches " .

are predicated on the contrary as sumpti on

of the es sen ti al permanence of some (why not a 11?} fears
unless they are subjected to special 'treatment
(Mowrer, 1964, p. 217).

tially

principles

That is, to continue approaching th.e foi-

aversive situation

(_CS)without experiencing some

sort of contiguous reinforcement is contradictory
haviorist

procedures."

In other words, these solutions

of the NP are contrary to the well-established
of extinction.

1

to be-

law. Mowrerargues that these explanations are

very circuitous

in their attempt to get around this principle

in its most direct application,
of parsimony.

and violate the principle
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But Mowrera1so be1ieves this naive behavioral exp1anation vio1ates 1earning theory in an even more direct way.
Where, we may ask, is the evidence that
fears are either established or perpetuated by means of rewards? Habits, as
overt, voluntary behavior, are reinforced
in this way. But fears, which are
mediated by the autonomic nervous
sys tern (_andare i nvo1untary), are
established and perpetuated by means
of punishment (_drive increment}, not
by means of reward (_drive decrement}.
The notion that fears are reinforced
by rewards is thus not a 1egitimate
app1ication of 'learning theory' but
a perversion thereof.
01owrer, 1964,
p. 21S)

The same critique

is applied by Mowrerto Dollard and Mi11er

(.1950), Wolpe (.1958), and Szasz (_1961) .
Mowrer's Solution
Mowrerhas been interested

in developing a neo-behavior-

istic learning theory which could account for
directed,

purposive, deliberate,

responsib1e behavior.

11

11

..

goal

or, if you will, free and

(Mowrer, 1964, p·. 11).

to his model is the princip1e of cybernetics.

Fundamenta1
Mowrer

proposed a mediationa1 theory of 1earning in which both
fear (and avoidance responses) and hope (and approach responses) are conditioned reactions which, as feedback
occurs, allow the organism to guide his behavior instead
of simply react.
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Applied to the NP, Mowrer's model would indfcate that
the neurotic refuses to heed the fe~dback he is receiving
(_in the fonn of hope and approach responses l and instead
he goes ahead with uncorrected responses with the desire
to achieve advantage.

Because of this,

real stimulus of which to be afraid.
Mowrerconcludes:

II

the neurotic has a
The fear is not unreal.

. so ca11ed psychoneuroses. and

functional psychoses can b.e understood only in terms of
palpable misconduct which has not been confessed or
expiated."

(Mowrer, 1964, p. 20).

Arguing with Szasz ll961), that neurosis involves
play-acting,

impersonation, deception and cheating, Mowrer

says this is the way it begins and is perpetuated.
its manifest, explicit

"But in

fonn neurosis also involves an in-

vo1untary out-cropping of the truth."

(}1owrer, 1964, p. 139).

The truth is that the neurotic is disregarding hope for change
and refuses to emit approach responses.

He is unwilling to

change. This out-cropping is the symptomatology of the
neurotic.

The derivation of the symptoms is the conscience

which makes the neurotic different

from the sociopath because

the neurotic has the decency to suffer even though he is hiding.

The neurotic represees the super-ego, according to

Mowrer, rather than the id, as Freud held.
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It is not that symptoms merely represent a strategy by means of which the
individual displaying them is trying
to manipulate others, in a selfish,
infantile, irresponsible way. It is
rather that a symptomis indeed a form
of communication, not in this manipulative sense, but as an involuntar
confession which the individual ego
conti'nues to try to avoid but which
the voice within (super-ego) is trying
to effectuate.
(Mowrer, 1964, p. 134)
11

11

11

11

11

11

But why do human beings err in the first
because we are necessarily

place?

stupid or inherently evil,

''Not
but

because we are personally inexperienced and unwilling to
'take the word' of others.

11

(Mowrer, 1964, p. 228).

Mowrer does not explain how this deduction is generated by
his model.
Treatment for neurotic behavior is confession, restitution, and re-establishment
with other people.

in "community or, fellowship
11

;

This means that one takes the instruction

of other people and does not hide the failure

to do so.

Thus, therapy cannot be predicated
on any such simple program as extinction or counter-conditioning.
Instead,
the desideratum, as Jourard properly
notes, is that of courage, the courage
to be known. (Mowrer, 1964, p. 233)
11

11

Behavioral Models and the Defining Characteristics of th.e NP
As the discussion demonstrates, there are two behavioral
models, the early avoidance model and Mowrer's two-factor model.
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Avoidance Model
Self-inflicted

behavior.

The defeat of the neurotic

is explained as secondary unintended results
behavior.

of avoidance

The avoidance behavior does not in fact prevent

the primary pain or suffering,

but it does reduce the anxiety

and the person temporarily feels better.

It is a substitu-

tion which helps the person avoid the fundamental problem.
The temporal element is important in that short - term pleasure
is pre-potent over long-term pleasure .
Repetitive behavior. . The repetitiveness

of the behavior

is explained through drive reduction acting as a reinforcement.

But since the fundamental problem is not solved, the

anxiety will return and again need to be avoided.
Paradoxical behavior.

Paradoxical behavior disappears

because the requirements of behavioristic
The underlying physical properties,
are described.

mythology are· met.

condittons and relations

The explanation seems reasonable.

as shall be shown in the critique,

However,

the whole system remains

paradoxical.
Creative and predictive
creativity

behavior.

According to Skinner,

is the emission of a novel, low probability

response from the response hierarchy, which achieves positive reinforcement from the environment.

Creativity,

its old-fashioned meaning, goes out with the qualities
freedom and dignity.

The creative and predictive

in
of

potential
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of neurotic behavior is not well explained in an avoidance
model. All creativity

becomes substitutive,

epi-phenomenal behavior.
stupidity

secondary and

In this mythology, neurosis is

and cannot have fundamental predictive validity.

Criticism of the Avoidance Model
In addition to the criticisms
following items are relevant.

wh.ich Mowrergave, the

The drive reduction hypo-

thesis has not stood the test of empirical research.

The

model cannot e.xplain the phenomenaof "secondary gain which
11

is an important factor in neurotic behavior.
benefits (or liabilities)

The secondary

of exhibiting neurotic behavior

are not easily accounted for through drive reduction and/or
extinction concepts.

The model cannot e.xplain the origin

of tne responses which. become symptoms. The model is circular
and paradoxical:

Howcan an organism avoid a situation

without recognizing it, but if it is recognized, how is it
avoided?
There is much written which points out the many
paradoxes of mechanism (Bronowski , 1956; Turbayne, 1962;
Maslow, 1966; Matson, 1976; Chomsky,1971). There are also
many ways that the limiting paradox of Skinner's writing
has been stated.

Matson worded it thusly:

"Whereman

himself is empty, passive, only awaiting the sculptor's
hand, his society palpitates
manifest destiny."

with ongoing motivations and

(1976, p. 117).
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Consequently, behaviorism becomes extremely conservative.
It is not the reform of society which behaviorists

pursue.

It is the reform of individuals through adjustment.
As various critics have pointed out,
there is a curious contradiction in this
line of argument. For, if Skinner is
correct in his deterministic assumptions, then his argu~ent is superflous
and futile since (as Paul Kurtz has put
it) if everything we do is strict1y
detennined, then we cannot choose to
master or control the environment, nor
can we choose to follow Skinner's
recommendations, unless we are detennined
(by the external forces ) to do so.'' On
the other hand, i f there is any point
at all to the discussion--if we can act
upon the environment, design ourcultures
and initiate behavior techniques--Skinner
is thoroughly refuted on his basic premises.
(Matson, 1976, p. 123)
11

Mowrer's Mode1
Self-inflicted

behavior.

Suffering is the conscience

reminding the person he has done wrong. In this sense the
self-inflicted

suffering is admitted as legitimate,

and moral behavior.

normal,

Avoidance is an escape and a cover-up.

Repetitive behavior.

The repetitiveness

of the behavior

is explained on the basis that the conscience has a real
sin with which to contend.

There is a stimulus to fear.

Avoidance is only temporary and the fear will return.
confession can stop the vicious circle.

Only
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Paradoxical behavior.

the paradoxical appearance of

the behavior is translated

into a lie.

Creative and predictive behavior.

The creative and

predictive nature of neurotic behavior is seen only in a
short-term sense.

It has corrective and directive

value.

Criticism of Mowrers Model
1

Surprisingly,
spiritualistic
earlier

Mowrers model comes out more like the
1

model than either the psychoanalytic or

behavior models.

It is very difficult

to see the

way in which Mowrerdertves his final solution,

that men

are not evil or stupid, but are hiding, from his model.
It is probable that this conclusion comes from moralistic
and rationalistic

metaph.ors and mythology. The interpre-

tation Mowrergave his model is easily translated
authoritarianism.
the existential
fortitude,

We shall

into

also see that it is similar to

model in that the final solution is moral

conviction and courage.

The model does not re-

veal the source of courage.
General Critique of Behavioral Models
As behavioristic

models have been exploited and explored,

they have become the dominant approach in modern American
psychology. At the same time, it has come to be seen as
a paradoxical system.

Its definitions

are essentially

cir-
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cular and it is paradoxical in nature for it has no way to
explain avoidance except through "infinite
(Mehrabian, 1968, p. 97).
strong 1anguage:

regresses."

David Bakan puts this conclusion in

"The de1i neati on, abstraction,

cati on of the stimulus is the response."

and i dentifi-

(Bakan, 1968,

p. 56).

Another critical

issue is the problem of induction.

Induction is a foundational assumption of his model. For
a general introduction and discussion of this issue, the
reader is referred to Jordan (1968, p. 123ff}.

Popper

expressed the problem this way: The whole inductive program
of science underlying behaviorism is paradoxical (Popper,
1962, p. 42f f) .

A critical

issue today is the problem of meaning.

Behaviorism has become a victim of its own reductionism and
apparently must commit verbal redefinition
behavior on a meaningful scale.
here can legitimately

to explain

The simple models examined

deal only with very specific and limited

behaviors.

Even though B.F. Skinner has explicitly

a life-long

atheoretical

position,

taken

he could not resist

trying to give his theory meaning in his book Beyond Freedomand Dignity (Skinner, 1971).
this book is essential1y

It should be noted that

a mythology generalized from his
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metaphors, model, and assumptions. 6
Perhaps most surprising from the analysis is that
Mowreris correct in showing the essential

similarity

of the

Freudian and behavioral models. They are both avoidance
and drive reduction models.
And, Mowrers model, in attempting to refute the
1

freudian and naive behavioristic
to the spiritualistic

mode1s, becomes very similar

and existential

models.

Model of the Neurotic Paradox (Seed Metaphor)

Existential

Existential ism, humanism, and phenomenologydo not fonn
a well-unified
larity

philosophy or psychology. The commonsimi-

they share is th.e metaphor of the Seed. Seeds grow,

develop, fulfill,

and actualize.

The "within" is important

rather than stimuli or responses.
qualities

which emerge from a seed.

You do not create the
You set the conditions

which pennit them to develop and prevent damage. Exfstential
emphasis on freedom stands in sharp contrast to Freudian and
behavioristic

detenninism.

Existentialism

emphasizes the

future and becomingness, as opposed to the past and fixedness.
Each individual is held to be unique and so cannot be forced
into a categorical mold. Existentialism,

humanism, and

6
For an excellent review of Skinner and radfcal behavior; sm, see NoamChomsky's NewYork Book Rev1
' ew art i c1e, ''The
Ca~e Against B.F. Skinner," 1971. Th_e language and ass·umptions
Skinner uses to construct his model are expertly revealed.
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phenomenologyalso share antagonisms:
mechanistic, reductive,

They are negative to

and disease metaphors about man.

Model of the NP
Sartre, who is mainly a philosopher, and May, a psychologist,

have provided similar verbalizations

the point of view of existentialism.

of the NP from

It is this:

"How

can we conceive of a knowledge which is ignorant of itself?"
(Chein, 1972, p. 92).

In other words, how do you deceive

yourself without knowingYou are deceiving yourself?
According to existential
morally neutral and indifferent
that he has.

thought, man is alone in a
univer?e.

Within him is all

There are no apriori reasons and purposes.

There is no established meaning to life.
Because freedom is inherent in being, so is anxiety.
To choose is necessarily to take risks,
or to make a disastrous

choice, or to confront the meaning-

lessness and dark aspects of being.
own finitude.

possibly to lose all

Being is aware of its

Therefore, added to anxiety (inherent in choice)

is dread of non-being.

Anxiety may impel a flight

inauthentic mode of existence--detachrnent,
or loss of individualism in confonnity.

into an

hedonistic pursuits,
Anxiety can be

lessened by authentic living through commitment. In doing so
the ontological anxiety is covered and one feels less anxious.
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The authentic man must make honest choices with full awareness
of the consequences even if these involve an increase in
anxiety.

Nevertheless, one continues to be existentially

anxious.

It is in this way that life becomes a deception

without one knowing it.
The Existential

Solution to the NP

Interestingly,
solve the paradox.

existentialism
Sartre's

does not attempt to re-

answer to the ques.tion of self-

deceit is that you deceive yourself by lying to yourself
and then "livi ng into" the lie.
lie more real than being.
to accept responsibility

One. attempts to make the

You deceive yourself by refusing
for yourself and

by

not constitut-

ing your own being through choice and decision.
called this "bad faith;"

Sartre

Eric Frommca1led it Escaoe From

Freedom, (Fromm,1941) .
The paradox stands: man must suffer either as a false
self or as a being alone in the universe.
ists'

answer is bravery.

The existential-

It takes will and strength.

a tragic view similar to Freud and Mowrer:
The drama (Oedipus as retranslated
by Ro11o May)
. is the tragedy of seeing the reality about oneself, confronting what one is and what one's
origin is, the tragedy of man knowing and facing conscious self-knowledge his own destiny. (May, 1967,
p. 101}

It is
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May indicates to us that,

To live with sensitivity

11

in this age of limbo indeed requires courage.'' (May, 1975,
p. 1).

The obstruction to courage is the contradiction

that

one must be fully committed to the act of bravery yet remain
aware that at the same time, one may possibl y be wrong. May
concludes:

11

Myfreedom...

live i n the dialectic

in any genuine sense ...

relation.

11

i s to

(May, 1967, p. 101)..

People who becomeneu!"otic deceive themselves and
refuse to

II

spe11 out how they are engaged in the rea 1
II

world.
Neurotic guilt--as is the case
with neurotic anxiety--is simply
the end result of unconfronted,
repressed, normal guilt.
(Jv1ay,
1967, p. 108}
Rollo May (1950, 1969, 19.75).has provided us with an
interpretation
optimistic,

of the seed metaphor which may appear more

but upon examination, reveals a basic image of

man in line with most other existentialists.

He uses a

concept of eras which includes the diamonic, defined as any
11

natural function which has the power to take over the whole
person (May 1969, p. 123}.
11

Sex, anger, rage, and the craving

for power are examples. In seeking love (eras) to overcome
existential

anxiety, there is death; the possibility

of

destruction in one s present state of existence (anxious as
1

it is) and being thrown into a void with even less security.
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"Mayholds that man must confront
...
what is tragic in our day, namely
the complete confusion, banality, ambiguity,
and vaccuum of ethical standards and the
consequent inability to act ...
(May,
1969, p. 10)
He maintains that man must courageously transcend the diamonic
by "taking a stand," and integrating

this shadow of Being into

h.imself, aspiring toward a deepening and widening of his
consciousness leading to creative growth.

The paradox,

May points out, is that it is, at one and the same time,
a potentially

creative and destructive

act.

1

Man s attempts to make meaningful the seemingly pointless efforts

in Being (the fate symbolized in the eternal

going and returning,

laboring and resting and laboring again,

growing and disintegrating

and growing again portrayed in

the tale of Sisyphus) is a recognition of our fate, and the
beginning of finding meaning in an otherwise meaningless
fatalism. 7 While we may not negate or mitigate the evil,
horror, and inevitable

anxiety of Being,

11

•••

we find

ourselves better able to encounter it and less lonely because
we encounter it together.

11

It is in a relationship

(May, 1969, p. 302).
of caring that we are able to

survive the cynicism and apathy which are the psychological
illnesses
11

of our day.

So alienation

is recast,

in the

schizoid system" of technological man, as a loss of the

capacity to be ulUmately personal.

Courage is shifted from

7The implementation of this myth to describe the existential
position is credited to Albert Camusfo The Myth of Sisyphus, New
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1955.
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simply fighting society's
corrnnitone's self,
being.

mores to the inward capacity to

through love and will,

to another human

Tragedy is in howwe as humans relate

escapable necessities

to the in-

of human fate.

Existential Model and the Defining Characteristics of the NP
Self-inflicted
the self-inflicted

behavior.

The existential

model explains

nature of neurotic behavior as being

due to escape from man's fundamental ontological

status in

being, or the anxiety of unauthentic experience.

Neur otic

behavior is non-self-fulfilling
unaware of the self-infliction

and deceptive.

One is usually

because the fundamental

avoidance is denied and the pseudo-existence is strongly
asserted.
Repetitive behavior.
behavior is explained.
the reality

The repetitiveness

of neurotic

The person must repeatedly assert

of the pseudo-existence he has adopted.

Each

momentary glimpse of the underlying emptiness and/or deceptiveness requires a stronger assertion

of the assumed

self.
Paradoxical behavior.

Life is paradoxical because few

men are able to stand in the tension of being and not escape.
To stand in being is to experience the reality

of "nothing-

ness" and th.e ontological meaning of anxiety.

To es.cape is

to experience the anxiety of falseness and deceit.
no satisfactory

way out.

There is
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Creative and predictive
been particularly

behavior.

Existentialism

has

excellent at describing man's predica-

ment. As a humanist, Maslowtakes man as the model of man.
He de.parted from previous psychologists
specimens."

In this way, he found self-actualizing

to all be creative.
creative,

and studied "healthy
people

Thus, it is the essence of man to be

and the more creative the more freely human a

person he is .

is a "genetic" quality which

Creativity

needs to be supported and permitted to grow, develop, and
actualize.
creativity

In other words, it is reasonable to say that
is self-expression

work. It is potential

in the existentialist

frame-

in all persons and is seen in the

lives of self-actualizers

.

The limiting paradox of this model is the problem of
self-reflexivity.
self-expression

The subject and object are identical.
is not creative,

All

nor developmental, or good.

Wenever know what the seed is until it grows. The future
is not to be stated,

it is to be discovered.

of the creative and predictive
is essentially
this.

pessimistic

potential

The explanation

of neurotic behavior

and apparently does not go beyond

Concepts such as the "goodness of man" and the "free-

domof man" are not really derived from the seed metaphor,
but are carried in from an humanistic philosophical
The literature

of existentialism

bias.

is darkly tragic except

for that of a few thinkers like Kierkegaard.

He moves beyond
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the existential

crisis

through a "leap of faith" (.Bretall,

1951,p.255).
Critique of the Existential
The existential
and literature,

Model

approach has produced much rhetoric

but little

theoretical

& Braginsky, 1974). It is essentially
which allows for no avoidance.

advance.

(Braginsky,

an avoidance model

In this manner it is

simjlar to both psychoanalysis and behaviorism.

It may be

seen as equally pessimistic in the sense that its basic
image of man portrays him as 1ost, 1eft up to h.i s own devi"ces
to create meaning our of meaninglessness, and without any
frame of reference or rules from which his risky steps toward
authentic Being may be measured.
It is a circular system.

Using Maslowas an e.xample,

the Braginskys' make this point clear:
a brief examination of some of these
testable propositions will be sufficient to indicate that Maslow, like
Skinner, presents us with nothing more
than his own value premises in the guise
of a "theory"; that his propositions
and central concepts, like Skinner's,
are tautological and untestable.
(Braginsky & Braginsky, 1974, p. 78)
Again, these same authors write:
This "testable" proposition, then,
tells us that to be self-actualizing,
_2.ldefinition, a person is "metamotivated.11 Howdo we know that he is
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metamotivated? Because he is selfactualizing.
Circularity is by no
means the exclusive property of the
behaviorists.
( Bragi ns ky & Bragi nsky,
1974, p. 79)
One of the interesting
tial-humanist

ch.aracteristks

of the existen-

movementhas been its group or social activism

in the face of an ontol6gically

individualistic

problem.

The group therapy movement, altered states of consciousness,
etc.,

are very attractive

to existentialists

Like behaviorism and psychoanalysis,

and humanists.
the model does

change the language used to talk about man. Thfs change is
more significant

than appears on the surface.

do sometimes create different

Translations

meanings:

Thus just as the behaviorists have
eliminated the chance for understanding man by using object rather
than people language, the humanists
have done the same by destryoing the
meaning of people language. (Braginsky
& Braginsky, 1974, p. 81)
The existential

model seems to be a description

NP which has no solution except a call to bravery.

of the
There is

no explanation of how one becomes brave other than to accept
one's givenness.

Mowrerand Freud conclude with this same

call for bravery.
Summaryand Discussion
I have been working wfth the conclusion th.at an image
of man includes the original metaphor asserted to provide
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meaning for understanding and predicting behavior, and the
subsequent models and myths generated by that metaphor.
The intent of this essay, as stated at the beginning,
has been to impact the attitude
in the state of affairs

of the reader interested

in psychology due to the various

metaphors used to describe and give-meaning to the image of
man. I hope that this interpretation
th.e conflict

of the literature

and

has brought light to a few of the contradi ctfons

and patterns of resolution employed by the great thinkers in
psychology. The point has not been to topple any theories
based on any of the metaphors.
go through in interpreting

The point is the process we

and attempting to resolve problems

like the neurotic paradox.
We have seen that fundamentally all the models of the NP
ana1yzed above have reso 1ved the paradox by moving it tcr the
mythological level.

This is generally permissable; except,

the models themselves to not include this solution within
their own interpretive

rules.

There are two essential

pro-

blems with this solution even though the models .may be
partially

effective

First,
behavioristic

on the practical

as particularly

level.

exemplified by the. Freudian and

models, the root metaphor is expanded to the

myth level apparently without recognition of this fact.
While a clinician

may maintain a certain distance in appropriating
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any one or a number of the images of man in doing therapy,
the theodst

generating the metaphors, myths, and models

does not have the freedom or interpretive

rules within the

images presented to transcend the limitations

he encounters.

Second, because each of the models we have considered
is on one level,

they become paradoxical because they tend

to get caught in self-referring

thought and language and

contain .no explanatory relations
transcending their own paradoxes.
systems.

or rules w~ich allow for
They tend to be closed

Wehave seen in the critique of each model that it

is doubtful if any escape paradoxical status.

Perhaps the

important meaning of this is that they turn out to be very
limited models. Their generative potential
hausted and the resultant

is rapidly ex-

paradoxes become acute rather

rapidly.
Creativity

for Freud is a result of sickness; for Skinner

it is an improbable response in the "response hierarchy;"
for Maslow i.t is being the best humanyou can possibly be.
None of these psychologi.es can help in understanding man as
a creative being.
Probably a 11 metaphors have a 1imited di scl os:ure range.
Some, however, may provide more interpretive

power than others.
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The limits of the metaphor and generated models and
myths are discovered in several ways. First,

the

11

fit

11

of

the image with the phenomenabeing experienced begins to be
too loose.

In this case it will no longer give adequate

meaning to experience.
Second, the usefulness of a metaphor may become limited
when it becomes eroded.

This is, it becomes so commonit is

no longer recognized as an interpretation.
reified

and taken as "reality

closed system.

11

It is perhaps

uncritically.

It becomes a

Meaning and understanding become arbitrary

and rigid.
Third, interactions

between different

metaphors) may cause conflicts.

models (mixing

For various domains of ex-

perience we can have simultaneously different
frameworks.

metaphorical

I be1i eve the prob1ems of clients

in therapy may

be understood in this way. A person may hold conflicting
metaphorical understandings of his conflicts
the anxiety described earlier.
to uncover the client's
at root of the conflicts,

A therapist's

and experience
role may be

image of himself and the antinomies
and either to operate within

that metaphor-model-myth framework or provide alternative
images to enhance meaning and possibilities
Any treatment can be effective

for resolution.

if it stands within, and is

coherent with, a metaphor-model-myth complex. It may be that
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if clients were preselected on the basis of their image of
man and matched to therapists

the statis-

and interventions,

tics of helpful interventions migh_t be significantly

increased.

Analyses similar to those completed above could be
done for all other leading images of man. The metaphors
whic~ men have used to understand man are rapidly being
exhausted.

They are limited by the rapid development of

serious paradoxes.

Psychology needs new metaphors, new

explanations of t he NP, new images of man, to transcend its
present state (Matson, 1976, p. 157).
the process of demystification,

It seems. to me that

as difficult

as this may be,

is rather easy compared to the ne..xt step--creating

new images.

A new metaphor is necessary to resolve a true paradox.

Then

work is done to explicate the metaphor (~onstruct models), perfonn tasks of confirmation (empirical research),

and amplifying

and generalizing the metaphor (.developing myths).

This tech-

nical development continues as long as it is productive and/
or until it begins to produce paradoxes again.

I am in-

debted to ThomasKuhnfor this hypothesis (Kuhn, 1970).
Psychologists must create new images of man, but they
have no new images of man. The models examined here do not
genuinely allow for creativity.

This is the limiting paradox

of present day psychology in attempting to resolve the neurotic
paradox.
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To re
translation

~ve the bind in the expression, explanation, and
dimensions of meaning in interpretation,

we need

a model which includes not only the language, thought or
action under consideration,

but broader contexts which

expressly allow for transcending deductions which are paradoxical (self-referring}.
The suggestion here is that psychologists ~eturn to the
libe ral arts, t o think creatively out of a broadened reservoir of ideas.

A free mind is one which is not "mystifle d

11

and is therefore able to destroy th.e limiting conditions
of one's ownmetaphorical understanding.

The creative mind

playfully juxtaposes symbols. J.J. Gordonwrote:
The element of playful impracticality
is repeatedly emphasized in autobiographical accounts of scientific discovery and fit on a corollary to
the double assertion that (a} language
is essentially metaphoric and playful
and only secondarily utilitarian;
and (b} the child's grasp of language
is initially playful and only later
utilitarian.
(_Gordon1961, p. 114)
Jerome Bruner agrees and chides teachers thusly:
The shrewd guess, the fertile hypothesis,
the courageous leap to a tentative conclusion--these are the most valuable
coin of the thinker at work. But in
most schools, guessing is heavily penalized and is associated somehowwith
laziness. (Bruner, 1960, p. XX)
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In closing,

I 1-1ou1
d like to quote Michael Po1anyi:

"Any effort made to understand something must be sustained
by the belief that there is something there that can be understood."

(.Polanyi, 1964, p. 45).

I hope in this thesis

there has been something to ent i ce the reader into believing
there is something to be understood .
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